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INTRODUCTION

Few except gunboat makers mourn the end of gunboat diplomacy.'

Although this traditional method of resolving investment disputes is
currently obsolete,2 the transformation has taken place primarily in the last
few decades. Rather than waiting for customary law 3 to provide security for
foreign direct investment, developed nations found a quicker path, the
1. Gunboat diplomacy is diplomacy involving intimidation by threat or use of military force.
Traditionally, stronger military powers were able to dictate terms to weaker ones. Here, an example
is instructive. In 1854, United States Commodore Perry opened Japan to foreign trade after 200
years of isolation. Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan: Background, Nov. 25, 2002,
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/ends/opening.htm. He did so simply by demonstrating
the superiority of American naval power. Id. The increasingly infrequent use of this method to
resolve international disputes is especially important given the destructive capacity of modem
weaponry.
2. Most nations have moved beyond the use of force to protect investments made by their
citizens in foreign states: "Modem international economic relations regulated through bilateral or
multilateral conventions were preceded by what then came to be known as gunboat diplomacy."
Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary
InternationalLaw, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 329 (1994). "In order to avoid the historical
difficulties associated with 'gunboat diplomacy,' countries have promulgated treaties to promote
foreign investment and instill confidence in the stability of the investment environment." Susan D.
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1525-26 (2005).
3. Customary law arises when a certain practice between nations becomes widely accepted as
obligatory and legally binding. See Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 336-37. Because it requires the tacit
consent of a majority of nations, customary law often develops slowly. The BIT movement is in part
an effort to speed up the process of outlining investor rights. The movement gained momentum after
World War II because international custom regarding foreign investment failed to address modem
forms of investment and was often subject to varying interpretations. See Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Their Grand Bargain,46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 68-69 (2005).
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Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).4

This new type of treaty outlined the

terms and conditions for private investment by individuals and companies of
one state in the territory of another. Specifically, it provided substantive and
procedural safeguards for investors whose investments were otherwise
subject to the whims of the host country.
Nevertheless, despite the assurances given in BITs, without a neutral

dispute resolution mechanism, national interests were still able to affect the
security of investments.' In response to the need for independent resolution
of investment disputes, the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created. 6 Now that ICSID is the

preeminent arbitral organization dealing with disputes between sovereign
states and individual investors, its decisions carry significant weight.'
Recently, ICSID arbitration panel decisions have employed conflicting
approaches to applying Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses in BITs to
dispute resolution provisions.8 These inconsistent decisions threaten to
frustrate the purpose of the BIT regime-providing states and investors with

confidence regarding their respective rights and obligations. 9
This article will examine the potential effects and problems associated
with this set of MFN decisions. Part II discusses the importance and
historical development of international investment law and practice. It pays
particular attention to the rise of the BIT and its effect on foreign direct
investment.
Part III discusses the effect of ICSID on international

investment. After describing the reasons for creating ICSID, this part
explains its structure and emphasizes its ever-increasing importance. Part IV
discusses ICSID's divergent approaches toward the effect of MFN clauses

on dispute resolution provisions in BITs. Part V addresses the problems

4. "It is this uncertainty relating to the law on state responsibility that has given an impetus to
the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties." Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 332; see also Salacuse
& Sullivan, supra note 3, at 76.
5. The intractability of national interests in investment disputes is demonstrated by the fact that
the World Bank felt it necessary to create the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes as a neutral arbitration forum.
6. "The key purpose in establishing ICSID was to assure foreign investors of protection under
international law from unilateral actions of host countries which could jeopardize their investments."
Vincent 0. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International Convention for
the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 21, 23
(2001).
7. "[M]ost BITs can, and do, provide for arbitration under the ICSID Convention." David R.
Sedlak, Comment, ICSID's Resurgence in InternationalInvestment Arbitration: Can the Momentum
Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 147, 160 (2004) (citing ICSID: Introduction to Bilateral
Investment Treaties, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm).
8. See infra notes 133-249 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 253-263 and accompanying text.
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associated with these inconsistent approaches.

Part VI discusses potential

means to remedy the conflict. Part VII concludes the comment.
11.

A.

GETTING BIT

The End of GunboatDiplomacy and the Rise of Trade Agreements

When the use of force was the primary means for settling international
disputes, stronger nations often imposed their will on weaker ones. Given

the abrasive nature of the practice, it is not surprising that gunboat
diplomacy occasionally resulted in investment-restricting practices. Perhaps
the most famous such reaction was embodied in the Calvo Clause. l'
Prior to 1914, Latin American countries protested being forced by
demonstrations of European military power to pay debt.11 On one occasion,
Germany, Great Britain, and Italy engaged in a joint naval intervention in
Venezuela. 12 This practice sparked outrage in several Latin American
countries. 13 The outrage ultimately resulted in constitutional and statutory
provisions, known as the Calvo Clause, that required foreign investors to
waive appeal to diplomatic protection in favor of seeking redress in local
courts under the law of the host state. 14 Understandably, the Calvo Clause

chilled foreign investment into South America. 5 This chilling effect,
coupled with changed views regarding the appropriate use of force in
international relations following World War II, may have accelerated the end

of military protection of foreign investment.
After the decline of gunboat diplomacy, the next stage in the evolution

of investment protection was the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation.' 6 Although these treaties focused primarily on facilitating
trade, they eventually expanded to include investment protection

provisions. 7 In particular, the more modem versions included guarantees of

10. See Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 329 & n.7.
11. Id. at 329.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 329 n.7.
15. Not surprisingly, gunboat diplomacy caused much of Latin America to become hostile to
foreign investment. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 74-75. This hostility began to
dissipate in the 1980s as emerging economies in Latin America began actively encouraging the
investment necessary to finance development. See id.
16. See id. at 72-73; Franck, supra note 2, at 1525-26 (citing E.I. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 119-22 (1965)). In an effort to
protect increasing amounts of foreign investment, the United States took a particular interest in these
treaties. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72-73. Eventually, the effort lost momentum as
developing countries proved increasingly reluctant to accede to U.S. demands. Id. at 73.
17. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72-73. In the immediate post-World War II period,
the United States initiated a program of concluding Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation in an effort to protect U.S. foreign investments. See id.
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prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation, 8 which
were enforced through such forums as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).' 9 While the development of these guarantees proved important,
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation still proved far from
acceptable to risk-adverse investors.20 In part, investors remained hesitant to
make foreign investments because the successful resolution of claims
2
required the investor's home state to espouse a claim before the ICJ. 1
Given the politically sensitive nature of this process, state support was not
always forthcoming.
Eventually, the absence of a direct method for resolving investment
claims under Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, prompted
the development of the modem BIT.22 One of the primary advantages of this
new mechanism was the inclusion of provisions that allowed investors
greater autonomy over claims against a host country.23 The greater security
offered by these BITs promoted increased investment, and rendered the
investment protection aspects of earlier treaties irrelevant.24
B. Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way and Follow Later
Although the BIT was an idea whose time had come, its adoption
did not take place uniformly. 5 Instead, the process occurred in three

18. David R. Adair, Comment, Investors' Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment
Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 195, 196 (1999). The early Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation merely proposed obligations regarding expropriation and repatriation of
earnings. Id.
19. Id. The International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, is the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations. International Court of Justice: General Information - The
Court at a Glance, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2006).
20. Adair, supra note 18, at 196-99.
21. Because the ICJ was established by the United Nations to resolve disputes between member
nations, only states may appear before the Court. International Court of Justice: General Information
- The Court at a Glance, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2007). Consequently, individuals are dependent on states to advocate claims at the
ICJ.
22. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1525-26 (noting that the movement to use treaties to protect
investments "began with Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, but soon moved
beyond this as these treaties were limited commitments that did not have a forum for resolving
disputes").
23. See id. at 1529 (noting that investment treaties are special because "they offer investors direct
remedies to address violations of... substantive rights").
24. See id. at 1526-27. One of the indicators of the importance of a direct method for investors
to pursue remedies is the exceptional success of the BIT movement. Id.
25. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 73-75.
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distinct waves.26 As will be shown, each wave was driven by distinct
motivations and goals.
1. Lead: German ingenuity
Not surprisingly, the BIT revolution was born of necessity. Following
its unmitigated defeat in the Second World War, Germany found itself
economically crippled and without any significant sources of foreign
investment. 27 As a result, it initiated a new phase of treaty-making that,
"unlike the previous commercial agreements, dealt exclusively with foreign
investment. ' 28 This novel approach possessed two principle advantages over

earlier initiatives. First, the specialized nature of the BIT helped avoid some
of the problems associated with Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, which were designed primarily to facilitate trade.29 Second, the

bilateral nature of the approach allowed for greater flexibility in negotiating
and drafting terms.3 °
Prior to the BIT movement, investors still faced significant risk when

investing in foreign countries.31 In the face of government expropriation of
foreign property, investors had little recourse.32 Although an investor could

bring a claim for recovery in the local courts, this "prove[d] to be of little
value in the face of prejudice against foreigners or governmental
interference in the judicial process. 33 Moreover, host governments could34
easily change their domestic law at anytime after the investment was made.
Consequently, investors had to rely on the benevolence of the host country
or the diplomatic support of their own government. Understandably, neither
of these options proved sufficiently comforting.35
Even after the

proliferation of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, an
investor still had to rely on his own government to support his claim before

26. See id.; Franck, supranote 2, at 1527 n.16.
27. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 73.
28. Id. Germany remains a world leader in BIT formation. Id. at 73 n.35.
29, See id. at 75-79 (explaining the goals of the BIT movement).
30, See id. at 77-79 (explaining the reluctance to join multilateral agreements on investment).
31, See, e.g., id. at 75 ("Without a BIT, international investors are forced to rely on host country
law alone for protection, which entails a variety of risks to their investments. Host governments can
easily change their own domestic law after a foreign investment is made, and host country officials
may not always act fairly or impartially toward foreign investors and their enterprises.").
32. See, e.g., id. at 75.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35, This is demonstrated by the rise and rapid proliferation of the BIT. For a detailed analysis of
the success of the BIT movement in fostering investment protection, see Salacuse & Sullivan, supra
note 3, at 79-91. Specifically, they note that "[w]hile that protection is not absolute (no legal device
provides absolute protection), investors and investments that are covered by a BIT certainly enjoy a
higher degree of protection from the political risks of governmental intervention than those that are
not." Id. at 90.
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the ICJ. 3 6 Given that even this step failed to ameliorate the risks investors
faced when deciding whether to enter foreign markets, it is not surprising
that the BIT was created.

In direct response to the problems of uncertainty that surrounded foreign
direct investment, the BIT provided two essential guarantees.37

First, it

guaranteed the application of a specific set of substantive rights. 8 Second, it

guaranteed recourse to direct remedies for the investor.39 Although these

aspects of the BIT will be discussed in greater detail later, it is important to
note that the success of the BIT program is in large part linked to these
investment-specific protections.

It should come as no surprise that Germany was not the only nation that
emerged from the Second World War seeking a means to better facilitate
foreign direct investment. In fact, several attempts to do so had already
failed before Germany successfully negotiated its first BIT. 40 What

distinguished the German effort was a focus on bilateral rather than
multilateral agreement.
The first attempt to create international rules to protect foreign direct
investment was the Havana Charter of 1948. a' Intended to create the
International Trade Organization, the Havana Charter failed to gain the
support of a sufficient number of states. 42 Subsequent efforts, including one

by the International Chamber of Commerce, suffered a similar fate. 43 The

36. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
37. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1529 (noting that "[i]nvestment treaties have two fundamental
innovations, which represent a departure from previous international agreements"); see also Carlos
G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary
Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301, 311-13 (2004) (highlighting substantive
and procedural issues related to BITs).
38. Franck, supra note 2, at 1529.
39. Id.
40. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72. Germany's first BIT was concluded with Pakistan
in 1959. Id. at 73. Earlier attempts at creating investment-specific protections included the Havana
Charter of 1948, the International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investment of 1949, and the
International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Rights in Foreign Countries of 1957.
Id. at 72.
41. Id.
42. Id. The proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) would have been given the power
to promulgate rules regarding international investment. Id. Although the effort to create the ITO
failed, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is beginning to consider the possibility of creating
rules governing international investment. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Cross-Cutting and
New Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/bey3_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28,
2005) (explaining the creation of a new working group to examine the WTO's role in investment and
competition).
43. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72. The International Chamber of Commerce's attempt
was called the International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investment. Id.
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failure of these multilateral attempts is understandable given the marked

difference between the objectives of capital-exporting states and developing
ones." Germany's contribution then, was to recognize that the competing
objectives could be addressed more effectively in a bilateral context rather
than in a multilateral one.
2.

Follow: The rest of the West catches up

The second wave of BIT proliferation was driven by the balance of

Western economic powers. 45 Although Germany was first out of the gate to
begin negotiating BITs, it did not take long for other European nations to
follow suit. Particularly quick to follow the trend were Switzerland, France,
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium.4 6 Recognizing the
importance of this new method of investment protection, European countries
had concluded approximately 130 BITs with developing countries by 1977.47

Despite coming to the game late, the United States was also eager to
play. Consequently, it launched its own BIT program in 1981. 4' As of the

end of September 2004, the United States had
"signed forty-five BITs with
49
developing countries and emerging markets.,

Although the second wave of BIT proliferation began in the West, it
continued to spread east as non-Western countries began to export
increasing amounts of capital into the developing world. Encouraged by the
experiences of the Western powers, countries such as Japan and Kuwait

began launching their own BIT programs.5 °

44. Id. at 77-78. The distinction between capital-exporting states and developing states is of
unique importance in international investment. One of the reasons that BITs were created was to
facilitate investment by investors from the developed world into the developing one (which had
traditionally been very poor at protecting foreign investment). Although both capital-exporting
states and developing ones have reasons to support the bilateral process, the reasons are different.
See id. at 78. On the one hand, capital-exporting states want to maximize the protections afforded to
their nationals who invest in other states. See id. On the other hand, developing states want to
increase investment inflows while at the same time protect domestic industry from foreign
competition. See id. As a result, capital-exporting states favor the bilateral process because they can
maximize their bargaining power over a developing state, while developing states favor the bilateral
process because they can choose the countries with which it is most beneficial for them to deal. See
id. For a more thorough explanation of the perspectives of capital-exporting and capital-importing
states, see Garcia, supra note 37, at 314-16.
45. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 73-74.
46. See id. at 73.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 73-74.
49. Id. at 74.
50. Id. (noting that "by 1997, Japan had signed four BITs, and Kuwait had signed twenty-two").
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3.

Get out of the way and follow later: Latin American and former
Soviet states get with the program

In the thaw following the Cold War, developing economies became
increasingly eager to court foreign investment.5 With the abandonment of
the centralized economic model in many parts of the world, nations that had
traditionally been hostile to foreign investment now saw it as essential for
Capital-exporting states, however, were
financing development."
understandably reluctant to invest money in these nations given their history
of expropriating foreign businesses. 3 In an effort to overcome their image
problem, "developing countries started to assume that they should consider
offering guaranties and protection to foreign investment. ' 5 4 As a result, the
governments of those countries began to pursue BITs with wealthier,
industrialized nations. 5
Of particular importance to the third wave of BIT proliferation was the
end of Latin American hostility to protections for foreign direct investment.
After decades of subscribing to the Calvo Doctrine, which limited a foreign
investor's remedies to those available in the domestic court system, Latin
American countries began reconsidering their approach to foreign
investment. 56 Not surprisingly, at some point it became clear that foreign
direct investment tended to flow away from states that failed to offer
increasing amounts of protection. In an effort to attract some of this
investment, Latin American countries began showing their newfound
investment-friendly credentials by participating in8the BIT program.57 As of
August 2002, they had made significant progress.1

51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 75 (noting that "[tihe number of expropriations of foreign-owned property grew
steadily each year from 1960 and reached its peak in the mid-1970s"). In 2002, the World Bank
Group surveyed transnational companies regarding the factors important to encouraging and
discouraging foreign direct investment. Garcia, supra note 37, at 320. Of particular relevance to
this comment, the survey noted that the existence of a BIT was considered a "very influential" factor
in selecting overseas sites by ten percent of manufacturing companies and sixteen percent of service
companies. Id.
54. Raul Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment
Disputes under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 501, 504
(2002) ("Credibility went hand in hand with the acceptance by states of their international liability in
the promotion and protection of foreign investments."); see also Garcia, supra note 37, at 307
(noting that "[iun regions like Latin America ... the inadequacies in the domestic legal order...
make it an undependable means of safeguarding investments").
55. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 74-75.
56. See Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 366; see also supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
57. See Vinuesa, supranote 54, at 505 & n.16.
58. See id.
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C. The CurrentProliferationof the BIT
Although understanding the history of BIT proliferation is important, it
is also important to understand its current scope. Predictably, with the
lifting of the iron curtain came a renewed interest in market economics and
foreign direct investment. 59 As the developing world discovered, the BIT
often acted as a key to opening the golden door to foreign funds.6 °
Consequently, there has been an explosion in the number of BITs concluded
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 6' As a result of this recent explosion,
a dense network of BITs links over 170 different countries. 62 As two

commentators note, "[w]hereas some 309 BITs had been concluded by the
end of 1988, 2181 BITs were concluded by 2002. "63 When one considers
that each of these BITs involves two countries, the scope of the movement's
success becomes evident.
D. The Unique Qualitiesof the BIT

The success of the BIT as a means for protecting foreign direct
investment rightly suggests that it possesses unique and important qualities.
In contrast to earlier attempts at investment protection, the BIT provides
investors specific substantive rights and direct remedies. 64 The importance

of these two developments can be deduced not only from the sheer number
of BITs now in existence, but also from the accompanying dramatic increase
in foreign direct investment.65

59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
Developing country governments that may have been reluctant to sign BITs due to
concerns that BITs would prove costly and bring them little additional investment may
now see evidence of increased capital flows as reason to justify treaty participation,
particularly if other countries with whom they compete for foreign capital have signed
BITs and obtained substantial foreign investment. Although BIT critics in developing
countries point to the increased number of arbitration awards against developing
countries as justification for their opposition, evidence of substantially increased
investment flows severely weakens their position.
Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 111-12 (internal citations omitted). "The proliferation of BITs
was the direct consequence of new trends towards a market economy where foreign investment in
developing countries was the master key to integrate those countries into fruitful global economy
relationships." Vinuesa, supranote 54, at 504.
61. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 75.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
65. "Over the past three decades in particular, BITs have proliferated as foreign direct investment
("FDI") has experienced phenomenal growth. Total annual FDI reached $1.1 trillion in 2000, a
drastic increase from $25 billion in 1973." Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 71 (internal
citations omitted). "At the same time as the number of bilateral investment treaties quintupled,
foreign direct investment has also experienced a fivefold increase." Franck, supranote 2, at 1528.
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1. Provision of specific substantive rights
Despite the number of BITs in existence, the general substantive
provisions of each are "remarkably similar., 66
Although there are

differences that arise from each unique treaty-specific negotiation process,
there are also discernable trends regarding the rights that states offer.67

Nevertheless, the basic principle is that sovereign governments agree to
protect investments made by nationals of another country. 68 To accomplish
this goal, BITs delineate "the specific substantive
standards that govern the
69
host state's treatment of an investment.,
Again, despite the fact that different permutations of substantive rights

are the norm, "[a] typical investment treaty generally provides investors with
a combination of up to seven different substantive rights., 70 First, the treaty
generally provides a guarantee that investors will receive payment of

adequate compensation if their property is expropriated. 7 Second, the treaty
generally prohibits the contracting states from hindering the free flow of
capital by enacting currency controls.72 Third, the treaty generally prohibits
the host state from discriminating on the basis of nationality. 73 Fourth, the

66. Franck, supra note 2, at 1529.
67. Id.
68. Id. "In general terms, a BIT contains provisions on guaranties for the admission of foreign
investments, as well as guaranties for sums transferred abroad related to the investments." Vinuesa,
supra note 54, at 506.
69. Franck, supra note 2, at 1529.
70. Id. at 1530.
71. Id.; Vinuesa, supranote 54, at 506. The U.S. Model BIT contains the following language:
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization
("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and (d) in accordance
with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment](1) through (3).
2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 6(1), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Sectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset..uploadfile847_6897.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
72. Franck, supra note 2, at 1530. The U.S. Model BIT contains the following language: "Each
Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay
into and out of its territory." 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 7(1),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Sectors/Investment/Model-BIT/asset-upload- fie847-6897.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2006). As two commentators note, "For any foreign investment project, the
ability to repatriate income and capital, to pay foreign obligations in another currency, and to
purchase raw materials and spare parts from abroad is crucial to a project's success." Salacuse &
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 85. Consequently, capital-exporting states press for substantial freedom to
undertake these monetary transactions. Id.
73. Franck, supra note 2, at 1530-31. The non-discrimination principle generally provides that
host-states cannot treat investors worse than domestic citizens (national treatment) or other
foreigners (most-favored nation treatment). Id. The U.S. Model BIT contains the following
language regarding national treatment: "Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party
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treaty generally requires the host-state to treat investments fairly and
equitably. 74 Fifth, the treaty generally requires the host-state to provide full
protection and security to investments.75 Sixth, the treaty generally requires

the contracting states to guarantee that investments will not receive
treatment less favorable than the "minimum standard required by customary

international law. 76 Finally, the treaty will occasionally include provisions
specifying that the contracting states agree to honor commitments that they
have given regarding an investment.77

In addition to providing specific protections, BITs must also define
78

which investors and investments qualify to receive those protections.

Generally the provisions regarding the scope of a BIT's application are
found at the beginning of the treaty and address four factors: "(1) the form of
the investment; (2) the area of the investment's economic activity; (3) the
time when the investment is made; and (4) the investor's connection with the
other contracting state.

79

Despite the fact that there are several factors,

BITs typically define "investor" and "investment" broadly. 80 This, in turn,
enables the treaty to provide adequate protection and allow for an evolving
understanding of investment. 1

treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
other disposition of investments in its territory." 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty art. 3(1), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Sectors/Investment/ModelBIT/assetupload_
file847_6897.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). It also contains the following language regarding MFN
treatment: "Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favorable than
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments
in its territory." 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 4(1), http://www.ustr.
gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset-uploadfile847_6897.pdf (last visited Jan.
30, 2006).
74. Franck, supra note 2, at 1531. The U.S. Model BIT contains the following language: "Each
Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." 2004 United States Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 5(1), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/Model_
BIT/asset_upload file847_6897.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
75. Franck, supra note 2, at 1531-32. Like the provision for fair and equitable treatment, the
provision for full protection and security is contained within article 5(1) of the 2004 United States
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. Supra note 74.
76. Franck, supra note 2, at 1532. Again, like the provisions for fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security, the provision for treatment in accordance with customary international
law is contained within article 5(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. Supra note 74.
77. Franck, supra note 2, at 1532.
78. Id. at 1533.
79. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 80.
80. Id.; Franck, supra note 2, at 1533.
81. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 80.
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2.

Provision of direct remedies for investors

Although BITs contain considerable substantive rights for investors and
investments, they are somewhat superfluous without corresponding
procedural rights. Consequently, the other essential aspect of the BIT is the

provision of direct remedies for investors. Rather than leaving an investor to
pursue his claim through the cumbersome ICJ process or the host state's

domestic court system, BITs often allow an investor to proceed directly to
arbitration. 82 Although BITs generally provide investors with the option of
pursuing litigation in the host-state, this option is rarely used. 83 Instead,
investors routinely choose to arbitrate their claims. 4

While dispute

resolution provisions in BITs often differ in scope and content, they "are
generally understood to constitute a unilateral offer by the Sovereign to
which the investor accepts by initiating
settle disputes by arbitration,
85
arbitration under the treaty.,

That BIT dispute resolution provisions grant private investors the right
to bring an action against a sovereign state before an international tribunal
should not be overlooked.86 Indeed, it represents a unique departure from
the customary practice of nations. 87 Rather than having to receive approval

to pursue a claim, an investor is allowed to act without regard for the
concerns and interests of his own state.88 In effect, the current investmenttreaty regime allows "investors to act like 'private attorney generals,' and

places the enforcement of public international law rights in the hands of
private individuals and corporations., 89 Given this type of autonomy, it is

82. Franck, supra note 2, at 1540; supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
83. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1541-42 (noting that "[i]nvestment treaties generally offer
investors a choice of where they can bring their disputes, often including the Sovereign's own
national courts or arbitration .... [but that nlot surprisingly ... investors generally arbitrate disputes
on a confidential basis before a panel of arbitrators").
84. See id. at 1542 (noting that investors choose arbitration, despite their options, due to "their
concerns about getting a 'fair shake').
85. Id. at 1542-43; Garcia, supra note 37, at 312 ("No arbitration clause or further consent to
arbitrate is required as the treaties themselves provide for this a priori.").
86. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 88.
87. See id. In international trade law, for example, there is no provision for private action against
a sovereign state. Id. Despite the fact that individuals suffer harm as a result of trade law
infringements, only states may bring claims before the World Trade Organization. Id.
88. See id.; see also Garcia, supra note 37, at 312 (noting that "the government of the foreign
investor (e.g., the other state party to the treaty) has no say or role whatsoever in the initiation or
outcome of the proceedings"); Franck, supra note 2, at 1537-38 ("This means investors are no longer
at the mercy of international politics and governmental bureaucracy when deciding to initiate dispute
resolution, and can avoid their litigation being swallowed by the larger foreign relations dialogue.").
89. Franck, supra note 2, at 1538; see generally Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and
InternationalInvestment Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 465, 466 (2005) (arguing that international
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not surprising that investors gain significant confidence from knowing that
their investments are covered by a BIT. 90
III. THE ROLE OF THE ICSID IN THE BIT REGIME
A.

Purpose and Creation

Although the creation of the BIT allowed investors significant latitude
in bringing claims against a sovereign state, this right proved rather hollow
without a neutral forum for resolving disputes. Consequently, the creation
of such a forum proved an essential event in the history of international
investment protection.
As an international institution that provides loans to its member
countries in order to foster greater production and development, the World
Bank (the Bank) plays a significant role in international investment. 91 In
fact, the Bank's "founders believed that [its] principal function... would be
to encourage international investment by private investors., 92 As a result, it
is not surprising that in the early days of the BIT movement the World Bank
received requests to help settle disputes among member states by acting as a
neutral advisor. 93 Although the Bank attempted to mediate the disputes,
concerns regarding its proper role caused it to consider new solutions.94 One
of the proposed solutions, presented in 1961, examined the feasibility of
creating an arbitration mechanism that could suit the needs of both investors
and governments. 95 The ultimate result of this proposal was the
establishment of ICSID under the International Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) in 1966.96 The
purpose of this new body was to "provide proceedings 'for the conciliation
and arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states and

investment law shifts power and authority from states to investors, tribunals, and other decisionmakers).
90. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1538 (noting that the system of allowing investors to bring
claims against sovereign states "created a mechanism to bolster investors' confidence that they will
receive a 'fair shake' when resolving disputes with Sovereigns, thus reducing the risks associated
with investment and, arguably, increasing the incentive to investment abroad") (footnote omitted).
91. See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 23.
92. Id.
93. See Sedlak, supra note 7, at 150.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 150-51.
96. See id. at 151.
On October 14, 1966, after years of preparatory work by legal experts from Africa, Asia,
Europe, Latin America, and the United States and after approval by the Board of
Governors of the World Bank, ICSID came into force as an autonomous international
agency under the auspices of the World Bank.
Id.
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nationals of other contracting states."'' 97 Moreover, ICSID sought to assure
foreign investors that they would receive protection from the unilateral
actions of a host country. 98 In other words, ICSID intended to balance the
power inequity between investors and host countries by providing "a purely
international dispute resolution forum." 99

B.

Composition of ICSID

The ICSID Convention provides for the creation of an Administrative
Council, a Secretariat, a Panel of Arbitrators, and a Panel of Conciliators. 00
Although these four organs play an important role in facilitating the
arbitration process, the actual work of hearing disputes and ruling on the
merits is the task of individual arbitral panels assembled under the auspices
and according to the rules of ICSID. For the purposes of this comment, only
the administrative bodies of the organization merit further attention and
explanation here.
1. The Administrative Council
The Administrative Council (the Council) is composed of one
representative from each state that is a party to the ICSID Convention. 10 In
addition, the President of the World Bank serves as the Chairman of the
Council. 10 2 As the governing body of ICSID, the Council has a range of
duties and is responsible for exercising whatever powers are necessary to
implement the provisions of the ICSID Convention.0 3

97. Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 502 (quoting Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata & Antonio R. Parra, The
Experience of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, in ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 299 (Christoph H. Schreuer ed., 2001)); see Sedlak, supra note 7, at
151 ("The role of ICSID was to arbitrate and conciliate investment disputes between signatory states
and investors of those states that were signatories to the convention.").
98. See Nmehielle, supra note 6,at 23.
99. Sedlak, supra note 7, at 153.
100. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes arts. 3-16, Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1273-77, 575 U.N.T.S. 162-170; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.
101. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 4(1), Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1273, 575 U.N.T.S. 164; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25. Because the members of the
Council are government representatives, they receive no remuneration from ICSID. Nmehielle,
supra.

102. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 5, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1274, 575 U.N.T.S. 164. The Chairman has no vote in the Council. Id.
103. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes arts. 6(1)(a)-(g), 6(3),
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1274-75, 575 U.N.T.S. 1164-'65. The obligations and powers of the
Council include the following:
(a) adopt[ing] the administrative and financial regulations of the Centre; (b) adopt[ing]
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2.

The Secretariat

The Secretariat consists of the Secretary-General, at least one Deputy

Secretary-General, and staff.' °4 The higher positions, Secretary-General and
Deputy Secretary-General, are elected by the Administrative Council upon
the recommendation of the Chairman. 10 5 As the principal administrative
organ of ICSID, the Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day running of
the Centre.10 6 The Secretary-General, the principal officer of the Centre,

performs the function of Registrar and also has the power to authenticate
awards arising from the ICSID process. 10 7 In contrast to the members of the
Administrative Council, the officers of the Secretariat are non-political.1 08
C. The Arbitration Process

The arbitral tribunals assembled under ICSID essentially act as
international investment courts. Given this role and the increasingly
frequent use of ICSID to resolve investment disputes that arise under BITs,

it is important to examine the arbitral process itself.
1. Jurisdiction
As with any formal court system, an ICSID tribunal must have

jurisdiction to hear a dispute. Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention
provides the basic understanding of ICSID's jurisdiction:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State

(or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another

the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration proceedings; (c)
adopt[ing] the rules of procedure for conciliation and arbitration proceedings (hereinafter
called the Conciliation Rules and the Arbitration Rules); (d) approv[ing] arrangements
with the Bank for the use of the Bank's administrative facilities and services; (e)
determin[ing] the conditions of service of the Secretary-General and of any Deputy
Secretary-General; (f) adopt[ing] the annual budget of revenues and expenditures of the
Centre; (g) approv[ing] the annual report on the operation of the Centre.
Id. at arts. 6(l)(a)-(g).
104. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 9, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1275, 575 U.N.T.S. 166; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.
105. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 10(1), Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1275-76, 575 U.N.T.S. 166-68; Nmehielle, supranote 6, at 25.
106. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 11, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1276, 575 U.N.T.S. 168; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.
107. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 9, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1275, 575 U.N.T.S. 166; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.
108. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 10(2), Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1275-76, 575 U.N.T.S. 166-68; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.
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Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent,
no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.' 09
For the purpose of this comment, it is important to note that the consent
of states that have signed the ICSID Convention can be presumed if ICSID
arbitration is provided for in a BIT.'"' Consequently, once a sovereign state
signs a BIT that allows for ICSID arbitration, it may not be able to withdraw
from arbitration with an investor from the other signatory country. Not
surprisingly, a large number of countries are effectively locked in to the
ICSID system as a result of their BITs.
2.

Initiating Arbitration

An ICSID arbitration may be initiated by a state that is party to
ICSID Convention, or by a national of a state that is a party to
Convention."'
Unless the case is manifestly outside the scope of
Centre's jurisdiction,
the Secretary-General will register the request
2
arbitration.'"

the
the
the
for

109. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. 174; Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 503 ("ICSID Arbitration Tribunals
(Tribunal) dealing with BITs assumed that article 25 of the Convention is the basic rule that
determined the ICSID's jurisdiction, and, as a consequence, that of its tribunals.").
110. See Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 503. In an ICSID arbitration involving the U.S. and
Argentina, the arbitral tribunal concluded that the relevant BIT constituted consent to arbitration
before ICSID. Id. Consequently, "the consent of the respondent state arises from its generic offer of
submission to ICSID arbitration as determined by the Convention." Id. According to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), BITs that reference ICSID may contain
the host state's offer to submit to ICSID jurisdiction. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, UNCTAD: DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: 2.3 CONSENT
TO ARBITRATION 17 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add2_en.pdf.
Furthermore, "[c]onsent through BITs has become accepted practice." Id. UNCTAD emphasizes
the importance of this practice by noting that ICSID clauses can be found in the "overwhelming
majority" of new BITs. Id.
11. Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28. For a detailed account of the initiation process, as well as the
materials that must accompany the initiation, see ERIC SCHWARTZ & REZA MOHTASHAMI,
UNCTAD: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES: 2.7 PROCEDURAL ISSUES 7-10 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
edmmisc232add6_en.pdf.
112. Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28.
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3. Selection of the Arbitral Tribunal
Once the dispute is registered, the arbitral tribunal is constituted
according to the agreement of the parties. 1 3 In the absence of an agreement,
the tribunal will be composed of three arbitrators." 4 Each party to the
dispute will select one arbitrator, and the third (the President of the Tribunal)
is selected by agreement of the parties.' 15 In the event that the parties cannot
agree on the appointment of the arbitrators, the Chairman of the

Administrative Council, after consulting with the parties, will appoint the
remaining arbitrators.116
4.

Recognition and enforcement of awards

The effectiveness of an arbitration ultimately depends on whether the
winning party can enforce its claim against the losing party. 1 7 As a result,
Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention contains the following language:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant
to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal
constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal
as if it
courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award
118
were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.

113. See id.; SCHWARTZ & MOHTASHAMI, supra note 111, at 11. Although the parties have broad
discretion in designating arbitrators, three restrictions may apply. First, the majority of arbitrators
must be nationals of states other than the states represented in the suit. International Convention for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 39, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 184.
"This prohibition ... does not apply if each individual arbitrator has been chosen by agreement of
the parties." SCHWARTZ & MOHTASHAM1, supra note 111, at 14. Second, the arbitrators must meet
the qualifications of Article 14(1). Id.; International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes art. 40(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 184. Consequently, they must
have high moral character; recognized competence in law, commerce, industry, or finance; and
reliability to exercise independent judgment. International Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes art. 14(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1277, 575 U.N.T.S. 168. Third, the
arbitrators must be independent of the parties to the dispute. SCHWARTZ & MOHTASHAMI, supra
note 111, at 14-15.
114. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1285, 575 U.N.T.S. 184; see Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28.
115. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1285, 575 U.N.T.S. 184; see Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28.
116. See International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 38, Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1285-86, 575 U.N.T.S. 184; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28. "The appointments
made by the Chairman of the Administrative Council must be made from the Panel." SCHWARTZ &
MOHTASHAMI, supra note 11l, at 15; International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes art. 40(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 184.
117. Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 29.
118. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965,
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Although execution of ICSID awards is the norm, it should not be taken
for granted.11 9 While the ICSID Convention does provide for recognition of
the award, Article 55 contains the following condition: "Nothing in Article
54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting
State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from
execution. ,,120 Unfortunately, this language leaves a loophole in favor of
states party to a dispute. 21 The problem arises when a state's domestic law

prevents execution of the award because of its provisions providing for
sovereign immunity.122 Again, despite this
loophole, execution of awards
123
remains the rule rather than the exception.

D. From Neglect to Preeminence

Although ICSID was established in 1966, it did not assemble its first
arbitral tribunal until 1972.124 The pace of cases brought before the Centre

remained slow for decades, and it is only recently that the number of cases
has increased sharply. 21 In fact, more than half of ICSID's total caseload
"has been launched during the last five years.'

26

To illustrate, filings have

increased from "approximately one per year in the 1980s to one or two per
month in 2001. '' 127 While the reasons for this explosion are unclear, it may
be tied to the recent growth
in foreign direct investment and the increasingly
28

large network of BITs. 1

17 U.S.T. 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. 184.
119. See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 29-30. Here, it is important to note that the ICSID
Convention treats execution as a distinct aspect of enforcement. Id. at 29.
120. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 55, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1292, 575 U.N.T.S. 194.
121. See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 31.
122. "The reason for this disparity in enforcing an ICSID arbitral award is that the ICSID
Convention does not alter or supersede the rules of immunity from execution against a state which
fails to comply with an ICSID award." Id. at 30-31. For a detailed discussion of the problems
inherent in executing an ICSID award, see id. at 31-39.
123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Whether this trend in execution is the result of
contractual provisions waiving sovereign immunity or the result of efforts by states to avoid
international condemnation is unclear.
124. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm
(last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
125. ICSID, About ICSID, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htn (last visited Feb. 4,
2006).
126. Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct
Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 55 (2005); see
Franck, supra note 2, at 1521.
127. Franck, supranote 2, at 1538.
128. See id.
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In addition to the increased caseload, the importance of ICSID in
international investment arbitration is also demonstrated by the number of
states that are party to the ICSID Convention and the number of instruments
that provide for it as a dispute resolution mechanism. Currently, 143 nations
have signed and ratified the Convention, and another thirteen have signed
but not ratified. 2 9 Moreover, "advance consents to submit investment
disputes to ICSID arbitration are found in about twenty national investment
laws, in over 900 ' BITs,
and under four recent multilateral trade and
30
investment treaties."'
Given the importance of ICSID arbitration to the international
investment protection regime, it is necessary and appropriate to examine
inconsistencies in the decisions and interpretations of ICSID tribunals. The
lack of customary international law governing the treatment of international
investments makes the current BIT regime essential to the protection of
international investors and investments. Considering that BIT provisions are
enforced through arbitration, it follows that the practice of arbitral tribunals
should face significant scrutiny. 13 Although no tribunal is bound by the
precedents of earlier arbitrations, inconsistencies could frustrate the purpose
of the BIT and investment arbitration
regimes by fostering uncertainty
32
regarding rights and obligations. 1
IV.

ICSID'S CONFUSED DECISIONS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF MOST
FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

Despite the fact that ICSID has been around since the 1960s, it has only
recently begun to address the scope of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses
34
within BITs. 133 Unfortunately, now that it has, the results are inconsistent. 1

129. See ICSID, List of Contracting States, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-statesen.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
130. Sedlak, supra note 7, at 152 (citing ICSID, About ICSID, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
about/about.htm). The four multilateral agreements are the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the Cartagena Free Trade Agreement and the Colonia
Investment Protocol of Mercosur. ICSID, About ICSID, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/
about.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
131. "Although some commentators suggest that an occasional 'wrong' decision is a small price
to pay for promoting aggregate gain through investment arbitration, the magnitude and the
increasing frequency of the inconsistency suggests that this conclusion should be reconsidered."
Franck, supra note 2, at 1558-59 (internal citation omitted).
132.
Inconsistency creates uncertainty and damages the legitimate expectations of investors
and Sovereigns. Investors that have structured their investments in a manner to take
advantage of coverage afforded by investment treaties suddenly discover they will not
receive those benefits. Likewise, Sovereigns find themselves in an untenable position of
explaining to taxpayers why they are subject to damage awards for hundreds of millions
of U.S. dollars in one case but not another.
Id. at 1558.
133. See supranote 96 and accompanying text; infra notes 141-252 and accompanying text.
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A.

MFN Clauses in BITs

MFN treatment has been an important feature of international trade
policy for centuries.135 More recently, however, MFN clauses have extended
into international investment policy. 136 In fact, the majority of BITs
13 7
currently in force around the world contain some form of MFN clause.
Generally, the clauses require each contracting state to provide to investors
of the other contracting state treatment that is "no less favourable than that
accorded to the investors of third states.' 3 8 Consequently, any favorable
provision provided for in a BIT will be available to every other country with
which the host country has a BIT containing an MFN clause. 3 9 In effect, an
MFN clause raises the "level of protection guaranteed by each BIT
concluded by a 140country to the level guaranteed by that country's most
protective BIT."'
B.

Interpretingthe scope of MFN clauses

Given that the inclusion of an MFN clause in a BIT can effectively raise
the level of protection to that of the most protective BIT, it is not surprising
that investors and host states would argue over the proper scope of such
clauses. Investors, of course, argue for the greatest possible protection; host
states argue for the least possible protection. Although well recognized
methods of interpretation exist, tribunals may still reach different
conclusions. 14 1 In fact, several ICSID arbitral tribunals already have. These

134. See infra notes 141-252 and accompanying text.
135.

ORGANIZATION

NATION TREATMENT

FOR EcONOMIc
IN

CO-OPERATION

INTERNATIONAL

AND

DEVELOPMENT, MOST-FAVOURED-

INVESTMENT LAW 3 (2004), available at http://

www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085.pdf. "[MFN treatment] can be traced back to the twelfth
century, although the phrase seems to have first appeared in the seventeenth century. MFN treaty
clauses spread with the growth of commerce in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." Id.
136. "The inclusion of MFN clauses became a general practice in the numerous bilateral, regional
and multilateral investment-related agreements which were concluded after... 1950." Id.
137. Stephen Fietta, Most FavouredNation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under Bilateral
Investment Treaties:A Turning Point?, 8 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 131, 131 (2005).
138. Id.

139. See id. By including MFN clauses in BITs states require "parties to one treaty to provide
investors with treatment that is no less favourable than the treatment provided by them to other
investors under other treaties." Id.
140. FEDERICO

GODOY,

BILATERAL

INVESTMENT

TREATIES:

MOST

FAVORED

NATION

TREATMENT 1-2 (2002), availableat http://www.bkgfirm.com/admin/pixAdmin/pubs/162FEN.pdf.
141. When interpreting treaty provisions, the primary aim is to identify the intent of the
contracting parties. See Fietta, supra note 137, at 132. This approach is adopted by Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Generally accepted as a rule of customary international
law, Article 31 states that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
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MFN clause arbitrations can be divided into two distinct classes. The first
deals with expansive interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses; the second
deals with narrow interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses. Although
the cases mentioned do not constitute an exhaustive list of ICSID tribunal
decisions on the issue, they are representative.
C. Expansive Interpretations
In both cases in this section, investors attempted to avoid specific
language within a BIT that required a waiting period to expire before a case
could be submitted to ICSID arbitration. Arguing that the MFN clauses
should be interpreted broadly, the investors asserted that they were entitled
to select individual BIT provisions provided for in other BITs. In particular,
the investors argued that the MFN clause in the BIT that applied to their
dispute entitled them to the procedures that existed in one of the host state's
other BITs. In both cases, the arbitral tribunals interpreted the scope of the
MFN clauses expansively.
1. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain
On July 18, 1997, ICSID received a formal request for arbitration
against the Kingdom of Spain (Spain) from an Argentine national, Mr.
Emilio Agustin Maffezini. 142 Maffezini's request concerned treatment that
he allegedly received from the Spanish government in connection with an
investment in an enterprise43involving the production and distribution of
chemical products in Spain.
In his request for arbitration, Maffezini invoked the provisions of the
Argentina-Spain BIT. 144 This, however, was insufficient to establish that
ICSID had jurisdiction over the dispute because the Argentina-Spain BIT
required that an investor allow the Spanish courts eighteen months to
process the claim before being allowed to submit the claim to international
arbitration. 145 To avoid the delay and the expense of litigating in Spain,

ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 340;
see Fietta, supra note 137, at 131. Another important principle of interpretation is that of ejusdem
generis. See id. at 132. According to this principle, "an MFN clause 'can only attract matters
belonging to the same category of subject as that to which the clause itself relates."' Id.
142. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan.
25, 2000, 1,availableat http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Id. The formal name of the BIT between Argentina and Spain concluded in 1991 is the
"Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of
Spain and the Argentine Republic." Id.
145. See id. 19. Article X.3 of the Argentina-Spain BIT, which addresses the "Settlement of
Disputes Between a Contracting Party and an Investor of the other Contracting Party," reads as
follows:
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Maffezini asserted that the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT
"allowed him to rely upon the more favorable treatment Spain offered to
Chilean investors in the Spain-Chile BIT.', 146 The Spain-Chile BIT required
a mere six-month
waiting period before an investor could file a claim
147
at ICSID.
Not surprisingly, Spain maintained that the provisions of the ArgentinaSpain BIT were controlling and prevented ICSID from exercising
jurisdiction over the claim. 148 In particular, Spain objected to Maffezini's49
expansive interpretation of the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT.'
It maintained that "under the principle ejusdem generis the most favored

nation clause can only operate in respect of the same matter and cannot be
extended to matters different from those envisaged by the basic treaty.''50
According to Spain, this principle limited the scope of the MFN clause to
substantive matters of treatment granted to investors and not to procedural or

jurisdictional questions.5 In addition, Spain argued that the discrimination
that MFN clauses were intended to protect against could only "take place in
connection with material economic treatment and not with regard to
procedural matters.'

52

The dispute may be submitted to international arbitration in any of the following
circumstances: a) at the request of one of the parties to the dispute, if no decision has
been rendered on the merits of the claim after the expiration of a period of eighteen
months from the date on which the proceedings referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article
have been initiated, or if such decision has been rendered, but the dispute between the
parties continues.
Id.
146. Barry Appleton, MFN and InternationalInvestment Treaty Arbitration: Have We Lost Sight
of the Forest Through the Trees?, I APPLETON'S INT'L INVESTMENT L. & ARB. NEWS, Feb. 2005, at
10, 12. The MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT is found in Article IV.2 and reads as follows:
"In all matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended
by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country." Maffezini,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 38. Commentators have noted that the MFN clause in the ArgentinaChile BIT is a broad one: "It is worthy of note that the subject matter of the MFN provision at issue
in the Maffezini case was particularly wide, covering as it did 'all matters' subject to the ArgentinaSpain BIT." Fietta, supra note 137, at 133.
147. Maffezini relied specifically on Article X.2 of the Chile-Spain BIT. Maffezini, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/7 39.
148. Seeid. 19.
149. See id. 41.
150. Id.
151. Seeid.
152. Id. 42.
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Ultimately, the tribunal agreed with Maffezini.'53 Consequently, it
granted itself jurisdiction over the dispute. 54 Relying in part on the
Ambatielos case, the Tribunal found that the MFN clause could extend to

procedural matters including the provisions for dispute resolution.'55 In the
Ambatielos case, the Commission of Arbitration determined that the MFN

clause at issue could, in conformity with the ejusdem generis principle,
extend to matters concerning the "administration of justice."' 15 6 Similarly,

the Maffezini Tribunal concluded that dispute resolution provisions are
"inextricably related" to the substantive rights granted under the BIT.' 57 In

effect, the Tribunal asserted that if the goal of a BIT is to protect investors
from the arbitrary and discriminatory practices of host states, "it would be
illogical to exclude from the scope of such protection the field of

procedural justice." 58
The Tribunal found further support for its decision by examining the
practice of both Argentina and Spain with respect to their BITs with other
countries. 159 Although at the time of the negotiation of the BIT at issue
Argentina still sought to require some form of prior exhaustion of remedies,
the Tribunal noted that Argentina had since abandoned that policy in favor
of providing for direct submission of disputes to arbitration. 160 The Tribunal

also noted that Spain's preferred practice was to allow for arbitration after a
six-month negotiation period. 16' Because the Chile-Spain BIT also provided
for a six-month negotiation period, the Tribunal suggested that "there were
no public policy considerations that would be contravened by allowing the

153. See id. at 64. "In light of the above considerations, the Tribunal is satisfied that the
Claimant has convincingly demonstrated that the most favored nation clause included in the
Argentine-Spain BIT embraces the dispute settlement provisions of this treaty." Id. Not surprisingly,
this decision caused immediate controversy. Appleton, supra note 146, at 13.
154. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 99.
155.

Id.; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 135,

at

13.
156. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 9 99, 99 49-50; Fietta, supra note 137, at 133. The
Commission of Arbitrators conceded that when viewed in isolation, dispute resolution procedures
are a different subject matter than the substantive rights. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 49.
The situation changes, however, when the dispute resolution provision is viewed in connection with
protecting rights generally. Id.
157. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 54.
Notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the clause does not refer
expressly to dispute settlement as covered by the most favored nation clause, the Tribunal
considers that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement
arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are
also related to the protection of rights of traders under treaties of commerce.
Id.
158. KATJA SCHOLZ, HAVING YOUR PIE ...

AND EATING IT WITH ONE CHOPSTICK -

MOST

FAVOURED NATION CLAUSES AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 3 (2004), available at http://www2.jura.
uni-halle.de/telc/PolicyPaper5.pdf.
159. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 TT 57-60.
160. Id. 57.
161. Id. 58.
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dispute to arbitration without previously submitting it
claimant to submit the
' 62
to the local courts."'

Perhaps realizing the potential reach of its decision, the Tribunal
attempted to set "important limits" to the extension of an MFN clause in the
dispute resolution context. 163 In particular, it noted that an investor should
not be able to use an MFN clause to override public policy considerations
that might have been considered fundamental conditions to agreement by the
contracting states. 64 The Tribunal then identified four situations where its
general rule regarding MFN clauses might not apply. 65 Finally, the
Tribunal asserted that "a distinction has to be made between the legitimate
extension of rights and benefits by means of the operation of the clause, on
the
the one hand, and disruptive treaty-shopping that would play havoc with
166
policy objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions, on the other."'
2.

Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic

In August 1996, the Argentine Republic (Argentina) began soliciting
bids for the development of a system of migration control and personal
identification. 167 Siemens's Argentine affiliate won the bid and signed a

contract with Argentina on October 6, 1998.16' After a change of
government in 1999, the contract was suspended.

69

Fewer than two years

162. Stephen D. Sutton, Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain and the ICSID
Secretaty-General's ScreeningPower, 21 ARB. INT'L 113, 120(2005).
163. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 7 56, 62.
164. Id.162.
165. Id. 1 63. The Tribunal set forth the following list of exceptions to the operation of an MFN
clause:
i) The local remedies rule because it is a "fundamental rule of international law." ii) The
fork in the road rule because otherwise it "would upset the finality of arrangements that
many countries deem important as a matter of public policy." iii) Provision for a
particular arbitration forum, such as ICSID.... iv) "A highly institutionalized system of
arbitration that incorporates precise rules of procedure," such as in the NAFTA because
"these very specific provisions reflect the precise will of the contracting parties."
Appleton, supra note 146, at 14 (quoting Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 63). Interestingly,
the Tribunal failed to provide any authority for the limitation to the scope of the MFN clauses. Id.
(noting that "at least one commentator has accepted that the limitation was 'invented"').
166. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 63. These exceptions to the extension of an MFN
clause appear problematic. As one commentator noted, "It seems incongruous to conclude that such
provisions are so fundamentally important to the host state that they should never be avoided
through the operation of an MFN clause if the state has voluntarily excluded them in another treaty."
Appleton, supra note 146, at 14.
167. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Aug. 3, 2004, at 23, availableat http://www.asil.org/ilib/Siemens.Argentina.pdf.
168. Id. 25.
169. Id. 26. The contract was allegedly suspended because of technical problems. Id.
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later, Argentina terminated the contract.7 On May 23, 2002, ICSID
received Siemens's request for arbitration against the Argentine Republic. 7 '
In the request for arbitration, Siemens relied on the provisions of the
Argentina-German BIT. 172 Just as in Maffezini, this was insufficient to
establish ICSID jurisdiction because the BIT required that an investor allow
the domestic courts of the host state eighteen months to process the claim
before being allowed to submit it to international arbitration.' 73 In order to
avoid the delay and expense of litigating in Argentina, Siemens asserted that
the MFN clause in the Argentina-Germany BIT allowed it to receive the
more favorable treatment available in the Argentina-Chile BIT. 74 This
treatment permitted an investor to avoid
first submitting a claim to the local
75
courts before initiating arbitration.1
In challenging ICSID's jurisdiction over the dispute, Argentina first
argued that reliance on Maffezini was inappropriate because it had involved
76
the significantly broader MFN clause of the Argentina-Spain BIT.1
Argentina also argued that the "relevant dispute resolution provisions of the
Argentina-Germany BIT had been specifically negotiated and must not
1 77
therefore be subject to amendment by virtue of the MFN clause.',
Moreover, Argentina suggested that when parties intended the scope of an
MFN clause to encompass the dispute resolution system, they stated so
expressly. 78 Later, Argentina asserted that limitations to state sovereignty

170. Id.
171. Id. l.
172. Id. 27. Siemens is a corporation based in the Federal Republic of Germany. Siemens A.G.,
About Us, http://www.siemens.com/index.jsp?sdc-p=cfil3278851mo1327903ps7t6uzl&sdc-bcpath
=1327885.s0 ,&sdcsid=3800911433 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
173. Appleton, supranote 146, at 20.
174. See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 32.
175. Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal Upholds Jurisdiction in Siemens v. Argentina; MFN Plays
ProceduralRole, INVESTMENT L. & POL'Y WKLY. NEWS BULL., Aug. 23, 2004, at 4, available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investmentinvestsd-aug23_2004.pdf.
176. See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8
34. As one commentator noted, "the MFN
provisions contained within the Argentina-Germany BIT were seemingly not as wide as the
provision in issue in the Maffezini case." Fietta, supra note 137, at 134. Article Ill of the ArgentinaGermany BIT contains the following MFN clause:
(1) None of the Contracting Parties shall accord in its territory to the investments of
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party or to investments in which they
hold shares, a less favourable treatment than the treatment granted to the investments of
its own nationals or companies or to the investments of nationals or companies of third
States. (2) None of the Contracting Parties shall accord in its territory to nationals or
companies of the other Contracting Party a less favourable treatment of activities related
to investments than granted to its own nationals and companies or to the nationals of third
States.
Appleton, supra note 146, at 20 n.52.
177. Fietta, supra note 137, at 134; see Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8
48-50.
178. See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 48. In support of this position, Argentina referred
to several examples of countries specifically addressing whether MFN clauses should extend to
affect dispute resolution provisions. See id.
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Argentina further argued that
should be interpreted restrictively. 179
MFN clause would deprive the
scope
of
the
of
the
interpretation
Siemens's

dispute resolution provision in the Argentina-Germany BIT of any
with generally accepted principles of
meaning-a result incompatible
80
treaty interpretation. 1

It
Argentina's final argument was perhaps the most inspired.
to
import
clause]
the
MFN
maintained that if Siemens was "entitled [to use
the advantageous aspects of the dispute resolution provisions of the
Argentina-Chile BIT, then it should also be required to import the

disadvantageous aspects of those provisions."'1 8' That is, one cannot pick
and choose advantageous BIT clauses, but must instead take the BIT as a
whole. In this case, importing the disadvantageous provisions of the

Argentina-Chile BIT might have precluded Siemens's claim.'82 Failure to
do so, Argentina asserted, would offer Siemens treatment more favorable
than that available to Chilean investors under their BIT. 183 Therefore,
Argentina bluntly stated that MFN clauses "do not serve to create a super
' 84
investment treaty that includes the main benefits of each different treaty.'
Ultimately, the Tribunal agreed with Siemens. 185 Consequently, it
granted itself jurisdiction over the dispute. 186 To begin, the Tribunal found

interpretive guidance in the BIT's object and purpose - "to create favorable

conditions for investments and to stimulate private initiative.' 8 7 In response
to Argentina's contention that reliance on Maffezini was inappropriate, the
Tribunal noted the difference between the MFN clauses involved but still

179. Seeid. 51.
180. See id. 59. In particular, Argentina suggested that depriving the provision of any meaning
would fall afoul of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id.
181. Fietta, supra note 137, at 134; see Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 124.
182. The Argentina-Chile BIT might have excluded the type of indirect claim that Siemens was
bringing against Argentina. See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 124. Because Siemens had
acted through a wholly-owned affiliate in Argentina, its claim could have been considered indirect
for the purposes of the Argentina-Chile BIT. See id. IN 23, 123. The Argentina-Germany BIT, on
the other hand, allowed indirect claims against the host country. Id.
183. See id. 124. Argentina claimed that providing this more favorable treatment was contrary
to the operation of the MFN clause. Id.
184. Id. To do so would frustrate the reasonable expectations of the parties when they drafted
their BIT. See id. Moreover, it would provide economically weaker countries with benefits
disproportionate to their bargaining power; thereby, giving weaker states a windfall. See id.
185. Seeid. $184.
186. Id.
187. Id. 81. The Tribunal notes that this approach is appropriate in light of Article 31(1) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id. That article requires that a treaty "be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose." Id. 80 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 3 1(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340).
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accepted Siemens's position. 88 It did so on the basis that access to certain
dispute resolution procedures was considered a distinctive feature of the
V 89 In fact, the
Argentina-Germany BIT.
status of the dispute resolution
provisions indicated that they were considered part of the protections offered
by the treaty.' 90 As a result, access to such provisions was considered part of
the "treatment" that the MFN clause guaranteed to investors. 191 Moreover,
the Tribunal noted that the use of the term "treatment" in the clause was so
general that it was inappropriate to limit the application of the MFN clause
except where "specifically agreed by the parties.' 192 Finding no specific
exceptions, the Tribunal decided that the MFN clause would apply to dispute
resolution provisions. 193 Having defined the scope of the MFN clause, the
Tribunal addressed Argentina's argument regarding importing both
advantageous and disadvantageous provisions of a treaty when relying on
such a clause. 94 Despite recognizing that "[t]he disadvantages may have
been a trade-off for the claimed advantages," the Tribunal asserted that, as
the name 95suggests, MFN clauses relate "only to more favorable
treatment."'
D.

Narrow Interpretations

In both cases in this section, investors relying on the Maffezini decision
claimed rights provided for in a BIT other than the one that governed their
dispute. 96 Arguing that MFN clauses should be interpreted broadly, the
investors asserted that they were entitled to select specific rights equivalent
to those most advantageous to the investors' aims provided in other BITs.' 97
In particular, the investors argued that fulfilling the purpose of the BITs at
issue required interpreting the MFN clauses so as to encompass dispute

188. See id.
T103.
189. See Fietta, supra note 137, at 134; Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 102.
190. See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 102.
191. See id. Both provisions in Article III of the Argentina-Germany BIT required that investors
receive "treatment" no less favorable than that extended to nationals or companies of third states.
See supra note 176.
192. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 106.
193. See id.
194. See id. 108-09.
195. Id. 120. The Tribunal also noted that it concurred with Maffezini that MFN clauses could
not be used to override certain public policy considerations that the contracting parties had thought
essential to agreement. See id. 109. Taking the analysis one step further, the Tribunal stated that it
would view a requirement essential to the agreement if it had been consistently included in other
treaties made by the host country. See id. 105. At least one commentator has noted two problems
with this approach. See Appleton, supra note 146, at 21. First, looking to other treaties for
consistent practice seems inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
fails to list such treaties as relevant to assist in interpreting treaties. Id. Second, the Tribunal fails to
address why a provision might be left out of a treaty if it represented an important public policy. Id.
196. See infra notes 204-209, 228-41 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 205-09, 237 and accompanying text.
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resolution provisions because they were essential to the protection that the
BITs intended to provide. 98 In both cases, the arbitral tribunals interpreted
the scope of the MFN clauses narrowly.' 99
1. Salini Constutorri S.p.A. and ltalstradeS.p.A. v. Hashemite
Kingdom ofJordan

In 1992, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) requested bids for a
public works contract called "Construction of the Karameh Dam Project."200
Two Italian companies, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. (Salini) and Italstrade
S.p.A. (Italstrade), jointly submitted an offer in May 1993 and were awarded
the contract on November 4, 1993.2°1 Having completed the work in
October 1997, Salini and Italstrade submitted a final statement setting forth

the amount owed them.20 2 Following Jordan's refusal to pay, Salini and
Italstrade filed a request for arbitration that ICSID received on
August 12, 2002.203
In the request for arbitration, Salini and Italstrade relied on the

provisions of the Italy-Jordan BIT.204 Reliance on the BIT, however, may
have required Salini and Italstrade to resort to the less favorable dispute

resolution provisions of the contract.20 5 In an attempt to avoid these
contractual provisions, Salini and Italstrade invoked the MFN clause in the
Italy-Jordan BIT.20 6 In effect, Salini and Italstrade asserted that the MFN

198. See infra notes 208-09, 237 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 213-27, 242-54 and accompanying text.
200. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICISD Case
No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, Nov. 29, 2004, 14, available at http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/cases/salini-decision.pdf.
201. Id. The two companies acted as a joint venture for the purposes of the contract with Jordan.
Id.
202. See id. 9 15. Salini and Italstrade claimed an amount equivalent to approximately $28
million. Id.
203. See id. 17, 1. On September 12, 2000, Salini and Italstrade received a letter from Jordan's
Secretary General of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation that stated Jordan's refusal to pay a sum in
excess $49,140. Id. $T 17, 15. This sum was the amount that Jordan's engineer calculated as
necessary to pay the contractors. See id. 1 15.
204. See id. 17.
205. Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT contained the following provision: "In case the investor
and an entity of the Contracting Parties have stipulated an investment Agreement, the procedure
foreseen in such investment Agreement shall apply." Id. 66.
206. See id. 21. Article 3 of the Italy-Jordan BIT contains the following MFN provision: "1.
Both Contracting Parties, within the bounds of their own territory, shall grant investments effected
by, and the income accruing to, investors of the other Contracting Party, no less favourable treatment
than that accorded to investments effected by, and income accruing to, its own nationals or investors
of Third States." Id. 104.
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clause should apply to procedural rights as was decided in Maffezini.

°7

The

result of such an application was to grant the investors access to the more

favorable dispute resolution provisions of the Jordan-U.S.A. BIT and the
Jordan-U.K. BIT.2 °8 Under those BITs, investors are "entitled to refer to
ICSID any dispute arising from their construction contracts. '20 9
In response to the MFN argument, Jordan asserted that the clause could

not apply to procedural obligations.210 Jordan further maintained that the
clause could not override the clear intent of the parties. 21 Moreover, Jordan

noted that the2' Maffezini
decision "could not bind the Tribunal and should not
12
be followed."

Ultimately, the Tribunal agreed with Jordan.21 3 Consequently, it
dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction.1 4 Before announcing its
decision, the Tribunal "observed that some MFN clauses, such as those
contained in many [United Kingdom] BITs, provide expressly that they
extend to dispute resolution issues, whereas others, such as the clause in
Maffezini, contain broad language referring to 'all matters' subject to the
agreement., 215 The Tribunal then proceeded to highlight four factors
supporting its decision. 21 6 First, the Italy-Jordan BIT did not expressly
provide that the MFN clause would apply to dispute resolution.217 Second,
the wording of the MFN clause at issue was significantly narrower than that
in Maffezini. 21" Third, there was no indication that the parties intended the
clause to apply to dispute resolution issues.219 In fact, the Tribunal noted

207. See id. 36, 102.
208. See id. 102. Article IX of the Jordan-U.S.A. BIT gives investors "the right to submit
investment disputes with the host State to ICSID regardless of any clause in the investment
agreement providing for a different dispute settlement mechanism." Id. 21.
209. Id. 102.
210. Seeid. 103.
211. See id. The clear intent of the parties was expressed in Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT.
Id. Jordan further asserted that "'even assuming that the most-favoured-nation clause could, in
theory, apply to dispute settlement provisions, it is subject to overriding public policy
considerations' recognized by the ICSID Tribunal itself in the Maffezini case." Id.
212. See id.
213. Seeid. 119.
[T]he Tribunal concludes that Article 3 of the BIT does not apply insofar as dispute
settlement clauses are concerned. . . . In the event that, as in this case, the dispute is
between a foreign investor and an entity of the Jordanian State, the contractual disputes
between them must, in accordance with Article 9(2), be settled under the procedure set
forth in the investment agreement.
Id.
214. Id.
215. Fietta, supra note 137, at 135.
216. See Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 118.
217. See id. "Indeed, Article 3 of the BIT between Italy and Jordan does not include any
provision extending its scope of application to dispute settlement." Id.
218. See id. "[The BIT] does not envisage 'all rights or all matters covered by the agreement."'
Id.
219. See id. "[T]he Claimants have submitted nothing from which it might be established that the
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that Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT demonstrated the parties' express
intention that very specific dispute resolution provisions should apply to
investors covered by the BIT. 220 Fourth, the Tribunal noted that Salini and
Italstrade had failed to provide22evidence of any Jordanian or Italian practice
that would support their claim. '
In reaching its decision, the Tribunal sought to distinguish Maffezini
rather than reject it.22 2 It did so by suggesting that the Maffezini decision,
like the Ambatielos decision, was justifiable because of the broad wording of
the MFN clause.

3

It is important to note, however, that the Maffezini

Tribunal did not base its decision on the breadth of the MFN clause in the
Argentina-Spain BIT.224 Instead, it asserted that "there are good reasons to
conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related

to the protection of foreign investors. 22 5 This language implies that the
Maffezini Tribunal might have been more sympathetic to Salini and
Italstrade's claim for protection under the more favorable dispute resolution
provisions of other Jordanian BITs. Following closer examination, it seems

that Salini marked "a decisive step away from the expansive approach that
had been adopted in Maffezini and back towards application of basic
' 226
principles of intemational law to the facts of each individual case. ,
Although the Salini Tribunal did not have the opportunity to comment
on the case, commentators suggest that it would have rejected the rationale
behind the Siemens decision.227 In particular, it seems likely that the Salini

Tribunal would have rejected an expansive interpretation because of the
more restrictive language of the MFN clause in the Argentina-Germany BIT.

common intention of the Parties was to have the most-favored-nation clause apply to dispute
settlement." Id.
220. See id. "[Tihe intention as expressed in Article 9(2) of the BIT was to exclude from ICSID
jurisdiction contractual disputes between an investor and an entity of a State Party in order that such
disputes might be settled in accordance with the procedures set forth in the investment agreements."
Id.
221. See id."[T]he Claimants have not cited any practice in Jordan or Italy in support of their
claims." Id.
222. See Fietta, supra note 137, at 135.
223. See Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 117.
224. See Appleton, supra note 146, at 22.
225. See id.(quoting Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Jan. 25, 2000, 54); supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
226. Fietta, supra note 137, at 136.
227. See id. ("Indeed, it is difficult to envisage the tribunal being able to support [the Siemens]
decision, given that none of the distinguishing features of Maffezini applied in that case."); Appleton,
supra note 146, at 22 ("The Salini v. Jordan decision is difficult to reconcile with that in Siemens v.
Argentina.").
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2.

Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic ofBulgaria

In 1998, a Cypriot company, which eventually became Plama
Consortium Limited (Plama), purchased an equity interest in a Bulgarian
company that owned an oil refinery.228 Plama later claimed that the
Republic of Bulgaria (Bulgaria) deliberately interfered with the operation of
the refinery in such a way as to cause material damage to the investment.229
In response to this interference, Plama, by a letter of December 24, 2002,
filed a request for arbitration with ICSID. 3 °
In the request for arbitration, Plama relied on the Energy Charter Treaty

(ECT)23 ' and the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT. 23 2 Although the ICSID Tribunal
eventually found jurisdiction under the ECT, this comment is concerned
with the Tribunal's decision regarding the BIT claim.233 Notwithstanding
Plama's reliance, the express provisions of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT were
insufficient to establish ICSID jurisdiction.3 In fact, the BIT contained a
very narrow arbitration clause that permitted ad hoc arbitration 235 only in
cases involving the amount of compensation owed to foreign investors
affected by expropriation.236 To avoid the dispute resolution provisions of
the governing BIT, Plama asserted that the BIT's MFN clause provided a

228. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision
on Jurisdiction, Feb. 8, 2005, 19; Appleton & Associates International Lawyers, Recent Decisions,
Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, 1 APPLETON'S INT'L INV. L. & ARB. NEWS,
Mar. 2005, at 11.
229. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 21; Appleton & Associates International Lawyers,
supra note 228, at 11; Judicial and Related Documents: InternationalCentre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID): Plama Consortium Limited v. The Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on
Jurisdiction (February 8, 2005), INT'L L. IN BRIEF (The American Society of International Law),
Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.asil.org/ilib/2005/02/ilibO50228.htm.
230. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 1.
231. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1998, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100.
232. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 1; Fietta, supra note 137, at 136.
240 ("Under Article 26 ECT and the ICSID
233. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24
Convention, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on the merits the Claimant's claims against the
Respondent for alleged breaches of Part III of the ECT."); Appleton & Associates International
Lawyers, supra note 228, at 11.
234. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 26.
235. "Ad hoc arbitrations are not conducted under the auspices or supervision of an arbitral
institution. Instead, parties simply agree to arbitrate, without designating any institution to

administer their arbitration."

GARY

BORN,

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION:

COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 12 (2d ed. 2001).
236. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 26; Fietta, supra note 137, at 136; Judicial and
Related Documents, supra note 229; Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal Finds Jurisdiction Under Energy
Charter, but Reins in MFN Shopping, INV. L. & POL'Y WKLY. NEWS BULL., Mar. 10, 2005,
In addition to
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-investsdmarlIO2005.pdf.
allowing international arbitration only for expropriation issues, Article 4 of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT
specified that the arbitration procedure was determined by the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules. See
Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 26.
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means

of incorporating

the

more

favorable

provisions

of other

Bulgarian BITs.237
In response to Plama's MFN clause interpretation, Bulgaria made three

basic arguments.238 First, it maintained that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary an MFN clause cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction where it
would not exist under the governing BIT.239 Second, it asserted that dispute
resolution did not fall within the scope of the MFN clause in the BulgariaCyprus BIT.240 Third, it stated that Plama could not override the clear policy

considerations expressed in the BIT by invoking the MFN clause.241
Ultimately, the Tribunal agreed with Bulgaria regarding the proper
scope of the MFN clause.242 In rejecting an expansive interpretation of the

clause, the Tribunal first addressed the Maffezini decision.243 In particular, it
asserted that the Maffezini Tribunal's declaration that "dispute settlement

arrangements are inextricably related to protection of foreign investors," was
legally insufficient to demonstrate that the parties to the BIT intended the
MFN clause to cover dispute resolution. 244 The Tribunal then discussed the
negotiating history between the parties. 245 Following the collapse of the

communist regime in Bulgaria, the parties tried and failed to revise the
dispute resolution provisions in the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT.24 6 The Tribunal

inferred from these negotiations that the parties did not consider that the
MFN clause would extend to dispute settlement.247 As the Tribunal noted,
"Doubts as to the parties' clear and unambiguous intention can arise if the

237. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 183.
The mechanism for arriving at that conclusion is, according to the Claimant, the
following: (a) the Claimant qualifies as an investor under the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT; (b)
the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT contains an MFN provision; (c) the MFN provision in the
Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT applies to all aspects of "treatment;" and (d) "treatment" covers
settlement of disputes provisions in other BITs to which Bulgaria is a Contracting Party.
In that connection, the Claimant relies, inter alia, on the Bulgaria-Finland BIT.
Id. The MFN clause in Article 3 of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT includes the following language: "l.
Each Contracting Party shall apply to the investments in its territory by investors of the other
Contracting Party a treatment which is not less favorable than that accorded to investments by
investors of third states." Id. 26.
238. Id. 37.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. 184.
243. See id. 193.
244. Id.
245. See id. 195.
246. See id.
247. See id. If Cyprus and Bulgaria believed that the MFN clause would extend to dispute
settlement provisions, further negotiation would have been unnecessary and unhelpful. Id.
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agreement to arbitrate is to be reached by incorporation by reference.

2' 48

Next, the Tribunal asserted that the fact that instruments like the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 249 specifically excluded dispute

resolution provisions from the scope of an MFN clause did not indicate that
if such an exclusion was lacking, then dispute resolution provisions should
be deemed incorporated.

Instead, "the intention to incorporate dispute

settlement provisions must be clearly and unambiguously expressed." ''
Although the Tribunal stopped short of expressly rejecting the Maffezini
decision, it proposed a drastically different approach to MFN clauses: rather
than assuming that the MFN clause applied to dispute settlement provisions
unless certain exceptions applied, the Tribunal asserted that such clauses
should not apply to dispute settlement except where it was the clear intention

of the parties.252 As at least one commentator noted, "This effectively
reversed the statements of principle set out in the Maffezini decision," which
held that MFN clauses should apply to dispute settlement in the absence of
the clear intention of the parties. 253 The Tribunal further tipped its hand by
commenting that the Siemens decision "illustrates the danger caused' 254
by the

manner in which the Maffezini decision has approached the question."
V.

THE PROBLEM WITH UNCERTAINTY

Given that the number of arbitrations involving investment treaties has
exploded over the last five years, the existence of some inconsistent

decisions is understandable. 55

Unfortunately, the increasing number of

248. Id. 199.
249. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Jan. 1, 1994, 107 Stat. 2057.
250. See Plama,ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 203.
251. Id. 204. An example of such practice is found in the U.K. Model BIT. See id. Article 3(3)
of the Model BIT expressly includes dispute settlement within the scope of the MFN clause. See id.
252. A recent jurisdiction hearing before an ICSID tribunal affirmed the Maffezini approach by
ruling that "[u]nless it appears clearly that the state parties to a BIT or the parties to a particular
investment agreement settled on a different method for dispute resolution of disputes that may arise,
most-favored-nation provisions in BITs should be understood to be applicable to dispute settlement."
Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal OKs Treaty-Shoppingfor Better Arbitration Options in Gas Natural
Case, INv. L. & POL'Y NEWS BULL., July 13, 2005 (quoting Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions of
Jurisdiction, June 17, 2005, http://www.asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf), http://www.bilaterals.
org/article.php3?id-article=2427.
253. Fietta, supra note 137, at 137. Fietta further notes that "had the tribunal agreed with the
general approach taken in the Maffezini case, it could have rejected the claimant's arguments on the
basis of one of the public policy-related exceptions to the general rule identified in that case.
Instead, it went much further by reversing the general rule." Id.
254. See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 226; Fietta, supranote 137, at 137.
255. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1521.
A single act or measure of a host State may adversely affect more than one investor. The
investors, in turn, may each submit the resulting disputes to arbitration under the terms of
an investment treaty of the State that covers the investors. There may as a result be as
many arbitration proceedings as affected investors. The scope for inconsistent decisions

1078

[Vol. 34: 1045, 2007]

Don't Get Bit
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

inconsistencies has caused concern about whether the current ad hoc system
of international arbitrations is appropriate for resolving treaty disputes.256
Although international arbitrations have largely replaced domestic courts in
settling investment disputes, they lack some of the more familiar and
important aspects of a classic judicial system.257 Specifically, international
arbitration decisions often lack the finality and comparative uniformity of
traditional court rulings.258
Not surprisingly, the ICSID arbitration system shares these
shortcomings. As the four cases addressed here demonstrate, ICSID arbitral
tribunals fail to present a unified approach to deciding the appropriate effect
of MFN clauses on dispute settlement provisions. 259
This type of
inconsistency causes two problems worthy of further attention.
First, inconsistent ICSID tribunal decisions regarding essentially the
same issue may foster a loss of legitimacy.26 ° One of the primary elements
of legitimacy is coherence.26'
Coherence "requires consistency of
interpretation and application of rules in order to promote perceptions of
fairness and justice. 262 Unfortunately, the different approaches to and
interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses adopted by ICSID tribunals
demonstrate a marked lack of coherence. Not surprisingly,
this failing
263
threatens to raise "the specter of a legitimacy crisis.,
Second, inconsistent ICSID tribunal decisions foster a loss of certainty.
Without question, different approaches and interpretations will result in a
lack of certainty regarding the meaning and application of MFN clauses.
This, in turn, will result in confusion regarding both investor rights and host-

in regard to essentially the same issues is obvious.
Antonio R. Parra, Provisionson the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Law,
BilateralInvestment Treaties and MultilateralInstruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 287, 352 (1997).
256. See Franck,supra note 2, at 1582.
257. See Charles N. Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B9.
258. See id.
259. See supra notes 141-254 and accompanying text.
260. It is not hard to believe that .'[a]ny system where diametrically opposed decisions can
legally coexist cannot last long."' Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court,
Focus EUR., Summer 2004 (quoting Nigel Blackaby of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourt04.html.
In discussing the status of
international arbitration generally, Charles Brower has suggested that inconsistent decisions and the
shortcomings of arbitration systems are causing a growing crisis of legitimacy. See Brower, supra
note 257.
261. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1585.
262. Id. Although "[e]stablishing such a coherent jurisprudence is difficult ... with new and
relatively untested standards," the need for it is clear. Id.
263. Id. at 1586.
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state obligations regarding dispute settlement.

Ultimately, this type of

confusion frustrates one of the primary objectives behind the BIT movement
- eliminating uncertainty regarding the substantive and procedural aspects of
investment protection.264

Although the effects of the loss of both legitimacy and certainty in the
ICSID regime are speculative at this point, they bear mentioning. Perhaps

the most likely effect of the loss of legitimacy is an increased number of
challenges to ICSID tribunal decisions. Whether this occurs through ICSID
mechanisms or through a host state's domestic courts when an investor
265
attempts to collect an award, it will challenge belief in ICSID's utility.
Another potential, although less likely, effect is an exodus of states from the
ICSID Convention. If the enforcement mechanism of the Convention no
longer enjoys legitimacy or fails to provide certainty, it is reasonable to
suspect that some states might withdraw consent to ICSID arbitration.
VI.

APPROACHES TO LIMITING THE EFFECT OF INCONSISTENT
DECISIONS

MFN

CLAUSE

Although there are several potential approaches to limiting the negative

effects of inconsistent MFN clause decisions by ICSID tribunals, some are
more practical than others. The purpose of this section is to highlight a
number of solutions and address the feasibility of each.
A.

ImpracticalApproaches

1. Annulment of inconsistent decisions
One of the purposes of international investment arbitration is to "'keep
dispute resolution out of the courts of one of the parties and protect litigants

from the costs of plodding through the long corridors of national judicial
bureaucracies.'

266

Accordingly, the ICSID Convention provides a self-

264. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3,at 76.
The lack of consensus on the customary international law applicable to foreign
investments also created uncertainty in the minds of investors as to the degree of
protection they could expect under international law. To gain greater certainty and to
counter the threat of adverse national law and regulation, the host countries of these
investors sought to conclude a series of BITs that would provide clear rules and effective
enforcement mechanisms, at least with regard to their treaty partners.
Id. (emphasis added).
265. Facing a potential deluge of adverse ICSID judgments following its economic crisis of early
2002, "Argentine executive branch authorities have already indicated to the press that any attempt to
enforce an ICSID award within Argentina will likely be challenged on constitutional grounds in
Argentine courts." Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under
BilateralInvestment Treaties: Background and PrincipalLegal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REv. 41,73 (2004).
266. Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 41-42 (quoting W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the
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contained control mechanism which prevents domestic courts from
reviewing ICSID tribunal decisions.267 Article 52 of the ICSID Convention

contains this mechanism and allows for annulment of awards in only a very
limited number of circumstances.268 Here, it is important to note that an
annulment proceeding does not allow review of the legal merits of a
decision.2 69 Rather, it provides for an ad hoc committee of three arbitrators
appointed by ICSID to examine the procedural propriety of the award.27 ° In

the event that the committee finds one of the enumerated defects, it may
annul the award completely or in part.27'

Ultimately, although the annulment mechanism is a useful aspect of the
protection offered by ICSID, it lacks the ability to review inconsistent
decisions for errors of substantive law.272 Consequently, it is inappropriate
as a forum for resolving the inconsistency regarding whether MFN clauses
should encompass dispute resolution provisions.273

2.

Amending the ICSID Convention

Another potential approach to limiting the effect of the inconsistent
MFN clause decisions is to amend the ICSID Convention. Although it is
unclear how such an amendment might look, it seems that careful drafting

ControlMechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 743).
267. See id. at 42; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 889
(2001) (noting that "domestic courts have no power of review over ICSID awards").
268. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 52(l), Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S 192. Annulment of an award is permitted on one or more of the
following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly
exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the
Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
See id.
269. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1547-48.
270. See id.; International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 52(3), Mar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S 192.
271. Franck, supra note 2, at 1547-48.
272. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
273. Further evidence of the inability of the annulment mechanism to address inconsistent
decisions is the fact that even if the committee found a reason to annul an inconsistent decision, a
new decision on the merits of the case is available only after the claim is submitted to a new tribunal.
See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 43. Considering that there is no guarantee that a new tribunal would
rule differently or act to harmonize inconsistent decisions, the annulment mechanism proves
unhelpful in this context. In fact, one commentator noted that "because legal errors cannot be
corrected in ICSID awards, the possibility of inconsistent awards is an accepted reality at ICSID, and
the correctness of decisions has been sacrificed for the sake of finality." Franck, supra note 2, at
1548.
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would create a provision that either expressly endorsed or rejected the
application of MFN clauses to dispute resolution provisions in the absence
of an expression by the parties. 274 Despite the relatively straightforward

nature of this solution, the amendment provisions of the ICSID Convention
make it impractical.275 According to Article 66(1), "[e]ach amendment shall
enter into force 30 days after . . . all Contracting States have ratified,

accepted or approved the amendment. ' 2 76 Considering that the number of
Contracting States is approaching 150, this process appears prohibitively
unwieldy.277 Moreover, as the number of Contracting States continues to
grow, the chance of a successful amendment continues to shrink.278
3. Creating an appellate system
Although several suggestions for creating an appellate system exist, one
stands out.2 79 The creation of an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court
appears uniquely suited to successfully addressing the inconsistent decisions
of arbitral tribunals. Among its attractions is the fact that "[a] single,
unified, permanent body charged with developing international law and
creating consistent jurisprudence will promote legitimacy more than
disaggregated arbitrations that come to different conclusions on the same
issue.
The ultimate effect of such an appellate body would be the
harmonization of decisions regarding disputed legal interpretations.28 1
Despite the potential utility of an Investment Arbitration Appellate
Court, its creation seems unlikely. Although it would not require the
unanimous consent of all parties to the ICSID Convention, creating such an
appellate court would require a significant number of signatories. Failure on
this point would prevent the court from achieving the sort of international
credibility needed to meet its objective of unifying standards of investment
treaty jurisprudence.

274. For example: Unless otherwise expressly agreed by the parties, no MFN clause shall apply to
the express dispute settlement provisions contained in their bilateral investment treaty.
275. See Sedlak, supra note 7, at 157-58.
276. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 66(1), Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1295, 575 U.N.T.S 200.
277. See ICSID, List of Contracting States, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-statesen.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); Sedlak, supra note 7, at 157 (noting that "logistically [the
amendment] process becomes unwieldy to the point of being impractical"). In fact, as of 2001, no
amendment proposal had even been made. SCHREUER, supra note 267, at 1265.
278. See Sedlak, supra note 7, at 157.
279. See Franck, supranote 2, at 1606-10, 1617-25.
280. See id. at 1617.
281. See id. at 1619-20. Considering the remarkable similarity of investment treaty provisions,
this type of harmonization would go a long way toward granting investors and host countries
certainty regarding their respective rights and obligations. See id. See generally id. at 1617-25 for
an extensive discussion of the utility and organization of an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court.
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B. A PracticalApproach

In contrast to other approaches that require the assent of a prohibitively
large number of states, the legislative (better drafting) approach requires the
assent of only

two.

28 2

In essence, the approach requires the parties to a BIT

to expressly state the proper scope of the applicable MFN clause. Whether
the parties decide to expand the clause to encompass dispute settlement

provisions is irrelevant. In fact, evidence of both expansive and narrow
interpretations already exists. For example, the United Kingdom includes
expansive language in its BITs, 2 83 while the United States includes
narrow language.2

In addition to resolving any ambiguity regarding the scope of MFN
clauses in future treaties, the adoption of an express policy by one of the
signatories may help resolve the issue for BITs that are already in force.285
Specifically, the adoption of a policy to define the scope of the MFN clause
within the provisions of the BIT itself demonstrates a state's public policy.
This, in turn, may prove sufficient to meet the public policy exception set

282. It is important to remember that the difficulties with creating multilateral investment treaties
eventually led to the bilateral negotiation of investment treaties. Supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text. Similarly, here, the difficulties inherent in amending the ICSID Convention or
in creating an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court seem to have already driven parties to
reevaluate and retool their approach to BITs.
283. Article 3(3) of the U.K. Model BIT, which is part of the MFN clause, contains the following
language: "For avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs (1)
and (2) above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 11 of this Agreement. [Articles 8 and 9 of
the U.K. Model BIT provide for dispute settlement]." Fietta, supra note 137, at 136.
284. Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the U.S. Model BIT, which contain the MFN clause, expressly
provide that the clause applies only with "respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." 2004 United States
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty arts. 4(1), (2), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/
Investment/ModelBIT/assetupload file847_6897.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). Noticeably
absent from the list of things covered by the MFN clause is dispute settlement provisions. Given its
express language, it is clear that the United States intends to exclude such provisions from the scope
of the MFN clause. Further evidence of this U.S. preference is found in the draft text of the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). In the draft, a footnote attached to the MFN clause in
article 10.4 expressly excludes the expansion of the clause to issues involving dispute settlement.
The Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10.4,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR-Final-Texts/assetuploadfile328_4718.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); see CAFTA: Effect on Investment Arbitrations,
PUB. INT'L L. NEWS (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer), Mar./Apr. 2004, at 1-2, http://www.
freshfields.com/practice/pil/publications/pil-news/7996.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
285. This possibility is essential to the practicality of the legislative approach. Without it, the
approach would require renegotiating thousands of BITs in order to effectively remedy the prospect
of inconsistent decisions. Such a renegotiation is understandably impractical. Franck, supra note 2,
at 1589.
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forth in the Maffezini decision.186 As a result, when faced with a claim, a
host state that opposes an expansive interpretation
may credibly rely on its
287
demonstrable expression of public policy.

VII. CONCLUSION

Currently, international investment protection depends almost
exclusively on a complex and growing web of BITs. Although the treaties
themselves provide for significant substantive and procedural protection,

these rights are of questionable value without a neutral and well-respected
forum for dispute settlement. Fortunately, such a forum exists in ICSID.
Unfortunately, a series of conflicting decisions regarding the proper scope of
MFN clauses threatens to cause a crisis of legitimacy and frustrate the BIT
regime's goal of providing certainty for both host states and investors.
While much ink has been spilled attempting to outline an effective approach
for resolving, or at least limiting the effect of, such inconsistent decisions,
only one approach seems practical. Like the BIT regime, the legislative
approach to addressing the scope of MFN clauses relies primarily on
bilateral negotiation and express agreement between the specific parties to

the BIT. Although some notable countries already employ this approach, it
is hardly widespread.

Ultimately, with greater attention to the drafting of

MFN clauses in BITs, host states and investors may continue to enjoy the
level of certainty regarding rights and obligations that BITs and ICSID were

created to provide, and the gunboats can remain in dry dock.
28
Gabriel Egli

286. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
287. Although this position is far from failsafe, it seems credible enough to qualify as a public
policy exception under both the Maffezini and Siemens decisions. The best that can be said is that it
is likely to work under Maffezini because an express policy is evidence of state practice. Moreover,
it is likely to work under Siemens because it is also evidence of consistent state practice.
288. Associate at Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. J.D., 2006, Pepperdine University School of
Law. B.A., 2002, William Jewell College.
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